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Abstract
Biometric authentication systems, based on secret key generation, work as follows. In the
enrollment stage, an individual provides a biometric signal that is mapped into a secret key
and a helper message, the former being prepared to become available to the system at a later
time (for authentication), and the latter is stored in a public database. When an authorized
user requests authentication, claiming his/her identity to be one of those of the subscribers,
he/she has to provide a biometric signal again, and then the system, which retrieves also the
helper message of the claimed subscriber, produces an estimate of the secret key, that is finally
compared to the secret key of the claimed user. In case of a match, the authentication request
is approved, otherwise, it is rejected.
Evidently, there is an inherent tension between two desired, but conflicting, properties of the
helper message encoder: on the one hand, the encoding should be informative enough concerning
the identity of the real subscriber, in order to approve him/her in the authentication stage, but
on the other hand, it should not be too informative, as otherwise, unauthorized imposters could
easily fool the system and gain access. A good encoder should then trade off the two kinds of
errors: the false reject (FR) error and the false accept (FA) error.
In this work, we investigate trade–offs between the random coding FR error exponent and
the best achievable FA error exponent. We compare two types of ensembles of codes: fixed–rate
codes and variable–rate codes, and we show that the latter class of codes offers considerable
improvement compared to the former. In doing this, we characterize optimal rate functions for
both types of codes. We also examine the effect of privacy leakage constraints for both fixed–rate
codes and variable–rate codes.
Index Terms: biometric systems, secret sharing, error exponents, random binning, fixed–length,
variable–length, privacy leakage.
1
1 Introduction
We consider a biometric authentication system which is based on the one described in [6, Sections
2.2–2.6], and on the notion of secret key generation and sharing of Maurer [7] and Ahlswede and
Csisza´r [1], [2]. In particular, this system works in the following manner. In the enrollment phase,
a person that subscribes to the system, feeds it with a biometric signal, X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn).
The system then responds by generating (using its encoder) two outputs. The first is a secret key,
S, at rate Rs and the second is a helper message, W , at rate Rw. The secret key will be used by
the system later, at the authentication stage and the helper message is saved in a database. When
an authorized user (a subscriber) wishes to sign in, claiming to be one of the subscribers that have
already enrolled, he/she is requested to provide again his/her biometric signal, Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
(correlated to X, if indeed from the same person, or independent, otherwise). The system then
retrieves the helper message W of the claimed subscriber from the database, and responds (using
its decoder) by estimating the secret key, Sˆ (based on (Y ,W )), and comparing it to that of the
claimed user, S. If Sˆ matches S, the access to the system is approved, otherwise, it is denied.
In [6, Sect. 2.3], the achievable region of pairs of rates (Rs, Rw) was established for the existence
of authentication systems where the following four quantities need to be arbitrarily small for large n:
(i) the false–reject (FR) probability, (ii) the false–accept (FA) probability, (iii) the privacy leakage,
I(X ;W )/n, and (iv) the secrecy leakage, I(S;W )/n. Specifically, Theorem 2.1 of [6] asserts that
when (X,Y ) are drawn from a joint discrete memoryless source (DMS), emitting independent
copies of a pair of dependent random variables, (X,Y ) ∼ PXY , the largest achievable key rate,
Rs, under the above constraints, is given by I(X;Y ). It then follows that Rw must lie between
H(X|Y ) and H(X) − Rs, where the lower limit is needed for good identification of the legitimate
subscriber (small FR probability) as well as for achieving the minimum possible privacy leakage,
whereas the upper limit is due to the secrecy leakage requirement. These limitations already assure
that Rw < H(X), which in turn is necessary for keeping the FA probability vanishingly small for
large n. The achievability parts of the corresponding coding theorems were proved in [6] using
random binning, similarly as in classical Slepian–Wolf coding.
More recently, in [9] these results have been refined by characterizing achievable exponential
error bounds for the above performance metrics. In particular, for a given rate pair (Rs, Rw),
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random coding error exponents and expurgated error exponents were found for the FR probability,
as well as sphere–packing bound, which is tight at a certain region of the plane of (Rs, Rw). For
the FA probability, the exact best achievable error exponent was characterized, and finally, more
refined upper bounds for privacy leakage and the secrecy leakage were derived.
This paper is a further development of [9], where the focus is on the trade–off between the
FA error exponent and the FR error exponent. In the design of the helper message encoder,
the following conflict arises: on the one hand, it is desirable that the helper message W would
be informative enough about S, such that in the presence of Y , the identity of the legitimate
subscriber will be approved with high probability. But on the other hand, it is also desired that in
the absence of Y , the helper message would tell as little as possible about S, in order to make it
difficult for imposters to access the system.
Indeed, the converse theorem in [9, Theorem 5] is based on the assumption that every type
class of source sequences {X}, is mapped, by the helper–message encoder, to as many different
helper messages {W } as possible, thus making it as close as possible to be a one–to–one mapping,
or in other words, making W is “as informative as possible” about the source vector X, and hence
also about the secret key S, generated from X . This is good for achieving a small FR probability
(or, equivalently, a large FR error exponent), at the expense of a limitation on the achievable FA
exponent. In particular, by relaxing the above described assumption, and allowing smaller numbers
of various helper messages for each source type class, one may achieve better FA exponents, at the
expense of worse FR exponents.
This raises the interesting question of achievable trade-offs between the FA exponent and the
FR exponent, which is similar, in spirit, to the trade–off between the false alarm probability and
the mis–detection probability in the Neyman–Pearson scenario, where this trade–off is traditionally
encapsulated by the notion of receiver operating characteristics (ROC). The difference, however, is
that while in the Neyman–Pearson setting, this trade–off is controlled by the choice of a detector
(or more precisely, by the choice of the threshold of the likelihood ratio detector), here we control
the trade-off via the choice of an encoder, in this case, the helper–message encoder.
To this end, we first derive an expression of the FR random coding error exponent as a function
of the desired FA error exponent for fixed–rate binning. This is a relatively straightforward manipu-
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lation of the results of [9], but it will serve as a reference result. The more interesting part, however,
is about extending the scope to the ensemble of variable–rate random binning codes, whose rate
function depends on the source vector only via its type (similarly as in [12] and [3]). The are two
questions that arise in this context. The first is: what are the optimal rate functions of the
secret–message and the helper–message for maximizing the achievable FR exponent for a given FA
error exponent? Upon finding such rate functions, the second question is: what is the achievable
FR error exponent as a function of the FA error exponent, and to what extent does it improve
relative to fixed–rate binning? We find an exact formula for this function and demonstrate that
the improvement may be rather significant compared to fixed–rate binning. Finally, we examine
the influence of adding a constraint on the privacy leakage, in addition to the above mentioned
constraint on the FA error exponent for both fixed–rate codes and variable–rate codes.
On a technical note, it should be pointed out that while in [9], the error exponent expressions
are provided in the Csisza´r–style formulation (i.e., minimizations of certain functionals of infor-
mation measures over probability distributions), here we pass to Gallager–style formulations (i.e.,
maximizations of functions of relatively few parameters). The reasons for our interest in Gallager–
style expressions are that they lend themselves more conveniently to numerical calculations (see the
discussion after Theorem 1 below, for more details), and that they may be of independent interest
on their own right.
The outline of the remaining part of this paper is as follows. Section II establishes the notation
conventions. Section III provides a formal definition of the problem setting, then it gives some
background (preliminaries), and finally, it describes the objectives. Section IV provides a prepara-
tory step of deriving the optimal rate functions that maximize an expression of the achievable FR
error exponent for a given FA error exponent, in both fixed–rate and variable–rate regimes. In
Section V, we derive the FA error exponents of both fixed– and variable–rate codes as functions
the prescribed FA error exponent. Finally, in Section VI, we examine the effect of a constraint on
the privacy leakage.
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II. Notation Conventions
Throughout the paper, random variables will be denoted by capital letters, specific values they may
take will be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by
calligraphic letters. Random vectors and their realizations will be denoted, respectively, by capital
letters and the corresponding lower case letters, both in the bold face font. Their alphabets will
be superscripted by their dimensions. For example, the random vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), (n –
positive integer) may take a specific vector value x = (x1, . . . , xn) in X
n, the n–th order Cartesian
power of X , which is the alphabet of each component of this vector. Sources and channels will be
denoted by the letter P or Q, subscripted by the names of the relevant random variables/vectors
and their conditionings, if applicable, following the standard notation conventions, e.g., QX , PY |X ,
and so on. When there is no room for ambiguity, these subscripts will be omitted. The probability
of an event G will be denoted by Pr{G}, and the expectation operator with respect to (w.r.t.) a
probability distribution P will be denoted by EP {·}. Again, the subscript will be omitted if the
underlying probability distribution is clear from the context. The entropy of a generic distribution
Q on X will be denoted by HQ(X). For two positive sequences an and bn, the notation an
·
= bn will
stand for equality in the exponential scale, that is, limn→∞
1
n log
an
bn
= 0. Similarly, an
·
≤ bn means
that lim supn→∞
1
n log
an
bn
≤ 0, and so on. The indicator function of an event G will be denoted by
I{G}. The notation [x]+ will stand for max{0, x}.
The empirical distribution of a sequence x ∈ X n, which will be denoted by Pˆx, is the vector of
relative frequencies Pˆx(x) of each symbol x ∈ X in x. The type class of x ∈ X
n, denoted T (Pˆx),
is the set of all vectors x′ with Pˆx′ = Pˆx. Information measures associated with empirical distri-
butions will be denoted with ‘hats’ and will be subscripted by the sequences from which they are
induced. For example, the entropy associated with Pˆx, which is the empirical entropy of x, will be
denoted by Hˆx(X). Similar conventions will apply to the joint empirical distribution, the joint type
class, the conditional empirical distributions and the conditional type classes associated with pairs
(and multiples) of sequences of length n. Accordingly, Pˆxy will be the joint empirical distribution
of (x,y) = {(xi, yi)}
n
i=1, and T (Pˆxy) will denote the joint type class of (x,y). Similarly, T (Pˆx|y|y)
will stand for the conditional type class of x given y, Hˆxy(X,Y ) will designate the empirical joint
entropy of x and y, Hˆxy(X|Y ) will be the empirical conditional entropy, Iˆxy(X;Y ) will denote
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empirical mutual information, and so on. We will also use similar rules of notation in the context
of a generic distribution, QXY (or Q, for short): we use T (QX) for the type class of sequences
with empirical distribution QX , HQ(X) – for the corresponding empirical entropy, T (QXY ) – for
the joint type class x, T (QX|Y |y) – for the conditional type class of x given y, HQ(X,Y ) – for
the joint empirical entropy, HQ(X|Y ) – for the conditional empirical entropy, IQ(X;Y ) – for the
empirical mutual information, and so on. We will also use the customary notation for the weighted
divergence,
D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) =
∑
x∈X
QX(x)
∑
y∈Y
QY |X(y|x) log
QY |X(y|x)
PY |X(y|x)
. (1)
III. Problem Setting, Preliminaries and Objectives
A. Problem Setting
The problem setting is similar to the one in [9], but with a few small differences, mainly related to
the fact that here, in contrast to [9], we allow variable–rate binning codes.
Consider the following system model for biometric identification. An enrollment source sequence,
x = (x1, . . . , xn), that is a realization of the random vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), that emerges from
a discrete memoryless source (DMS), PX , with a finite alphabet X , is fed into an enrollment
encoder, E , that generates two outputs: a secret key, s (a realization of a random variable S),
and a helper message, w (a realization of W ), both taking values in finite alphabets, Sn and Wn,
respectively. In the fixed–rate regime, Sn = {1, 2, . . . , e
nRs} and Wn = {1, 2, . . . , e
nRw} (assuming
that enRs and enRw are integers), where Rs is the secret–key rate, and Rw is the helper–message
rate. In the variable–rate regime, we allow both rates to depend on the type QX of the given
input vector x. In particular, in the variable rate regime, each x ∈ T (QX) is mapped, by the
secret–key encoder and by the helper–message encoder, into s ∈ Sn(QX) = {0, 1, . . . , e
nRs(QX)}
and w ∈ Wn(QX) = {0, 1, . . . , e
nRw(QX)}, respectively, where Rs(QX) and Rw(QX), henceforth
referred to as rate functions, are given continuous functions of QX . These encodings designate the
enrollment stage.
Since the fixed–rate case is obviously a special case of the variable–rate case, our description
will henceforth relate to the variable–rate case, with the understanding that in the fixed–rate case,
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Rs(QX) and Rw(QX) are just constants, denoted Rs and Rw, independent of QX .
As in [6], we consider the ensemble of enrollment encoders, {E}, generated by random binning,
where for each source vector x ∈ X , one selects independently at random, both a secret key and
a helper message, under the uniform distributions across Sn(QX) and Wn(QX), respectively. We
denote by w = f(x) and s = g(x), the randomly selected bin assignments for both outputs.
The authentication decoder, A, which is aware of the randomly selected encoder, E , is fed by two
inputs: the helper message w and an authentication source sequence, y = (y1, . . . , yn) (a realization
of Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)), that is produced at the output of a discrete memoryless channel (DMC),
PY |X , with a finite output alphabet Y, that is fed by x. The output of the authentication decoder
is sˆ = U(y,w) (a realization of Sˆ), which is an estimate (possibly, randomized) of the secret key,
s. If sˆ = s, access to the system is granted, otherwise, it is denied. This decoding operation stands
for the authentication stage.
The optimal estimator of s, based on (y,w), in the sense of minimum FR probability, Pr{Sˆ 6=
S}, is the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimator, given by
sˆMAP = U(y,w)
∆
= argmax
s
P (s,w|y) = argmax
s
∑
x∈Xn
P (x|y) · I{f(x) = w} · I{g(x) = s}, (2)
where P (x|y) (shorthand notation for PX |Y (x|y)) is the posterior probability of X = x given
Y = y, that is induced by the product distribution, PXY (and the subscript XY will sometimes
be suppressed for simplicity, when there is no risk of compromising clarity).
As in [9], here too, we consider the framework of generalized stochastic likelihood decoders
(GLDs) [8], [10], [11], [14], where the decoder randomly selects its output sˆ according to the
posterior distribution
P˜ (s|y,w) =
∑
x∈Xn exp{na(Pˆxy)} · I{f(x) = w} · I{g(x) = s}∑
x∈Xn exp{na(Pˆxy)} · I{f(x) = w}
, (3)
where the function a(·), which will be referred to as the decoding metric, is any continuous function
of the joint empirical distribution Pˆxy. As explained in [9], as well as in earlier studies, the
motivation for considering GLDs is that they provide a unified framework for examining a large
variety of decoders. For example, with
a(Pˆxy) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
Pˆxy(x, y) lnPX|Y (x|y), (4)
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we have the ordinary likelihood decoder [10], [11], [14]. For
a(Pˆxy) = β
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
Pˆxy(x, y) lnPX|Y (x|y), (5)
β > 0 being a parameter, we extend this to a parametric family of decoders. In particular, β →∞
leads to the ordinary MAP decoder, sˆMAP. Other choices of a(·) are associated with mismatched
metrics,
a(Pˆxy) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
Pˆxy(x, y) lnP
′(x|y), (6)
P ′ being different from PX|Y , and
a(Pˆxy) = −βHˆxy(X|Y ), (7)
which for β →∞, tends to the universal minimum entropy decoder. When a(Pˆxy) = β · α(Pˆxy),
α(·) being an arbitrary function and β →∞, we end up with Csisza´r’s α–decoder [4].
An illegal user (imposter), who claims for a given legal identity, does not have the correlated
biometric data y, and so, the best he/she can do is to estimate s based on w, and then forge any
fake biometric data y˜, which together with w, would cause the decoder to output this estimate of
s. More precisely, the imposter first estimates s according to
s˜ = V (w)
∆
= argmax
s
P (s|w) = argmax
s
∑
x∈Xn
P (x) · I{f(x) = w} · I{g(x) = s}, (8)
and then generates any y˜ ∈ Yn such that U(y˜,w) = s˜, and uses it as the biometric signal for
authentication.
B. Preliminaries
In [9, Theorems 1, 4, and 5], the following two results (among others) were derived for fixed–rate
binning at rates Rw and Rs: the best achievable FA exponent is given by
EFA(Rw, Rs) = min
QX
[D(QX‖PX) + min{Rs, [HQ(X)−Rw]+}], (9)
and the random coding FR exponent is given by,
EFR(Rw) = min
QX0Y
{D(QX0Y ‖PXY ) + E(Rw, QX0Y )}, (10)
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where
E(Rw, QX0Y ) = min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+]+. (11)
As shown in [9, eq. (12)], for the decoding metric a(Q) = −HQ(X|Y ), eq. (11) simplifies to
E(Rw, QX0Y ) = [Rw −HQ(X0|Y )]+, (12)
which is equivalent to the error exponent expression corresponding to optimal MAP decoding, sˆMAP
(i.e., eq. (5) with β →∞).
C. Objectives
As described in the Introduction, our first objective is to derive the FR error exponent as a function
of the prescribed FA error exponent, henceforth referred to as the FR–FA trade-off function, for
fixed–rate codes with optimal rate functions and optimal decoding metrics. This FR–FA trade-off
function will be derived from eqs. (9)–(11). The more interesting goal would then be to extend the
scope to variable–rate codes, derive optimal rate functions, R∗w(QX) and R
∗
s (QX), then use them
to obtain the FR–FA trade–off function for variable–rate codes together with their own optimal
decoding metrics, and finally, compare to the trade-off function of fixed–rate codes.
Another objective is to examine the effect of imposing a privacy leakage constraint in addition
to the FA error exponent constraint. This will be carried out in both the fixed–rate regime and the
variable–rate regime.
IV. Optimal Rate Functions and Decoding Metrics
We begin by deriving optimal rate functions for both fixed–rate codes and variable–rate codes.
A. Fixed–Rate Codes
For fixed–rate codes, the following lemma establishes the optimal helper–message rate, Rw, and
secret key rate, Rs, for a given value, E0 > 0, of the FA error exponent, EFA.
Lemma 1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of fixed–rate codes that achieve
EFA(Rw, Rs) ≥ E0 are:
Rs ≥ E0, (13)
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Rw ≤ R
∗
w
(E0)
∆
= min
{QX : D(QX‖PX)≤E0}
EQ log
1
PX(X)
− E0
= sup
λ≥0
{
−λ ln
(∑
x∈X
[PX(x)]
1+1/λ
)
− (1 + λ)E0
}
. (14)
Note that the requirement Rs ≥ E0 is quite intuitive, because even a blind guess of S may
succeed with probability of e−nRs . It was shown in [13] that the best achievable FA exponent is
given in turn by I(X;Y ). This is coherent with the result [6, Theorem 2.1] that I(X;Y ) is also an
achievable upper bound on Rs.
Proof of Lemma 1. From eq. (9), it is immediately seen that the statement, EFA(Rw, Rs) ≥ E0, is
equivalent to the statement
∀ QX D(QX‖PX ) + min{Rs, [HQ(X) −Rw]+} ≥ E0, (15)
which in turn is equivalent to the two simultaneous statements,
∀ QX Rs ≥ E0 −D(QX‖PX) (16)
∀ QX [HQ(X) −Rw]+ ≥ E0 −D(QX‖PX) (17)
The former happens if and only if Rs ≥ E0, which is eq. (13). As for the latter, forD(QX‖PX ) ≥ E0,
the r.h.s. is non–positive, whereas the l.h.s. is non–negative, and so, there is no limitation on Rw,
which is associated with the region {QX : D(QX‖PX) ≥ E0}. For D(QX‖PX) < E0, on the other
hand, we must have HQ(X) −Rw ≥ E0 −D(QX‖PX ), or equivalently,
Rw ≤ HQ(X) +D(QX‖PX)− E0 ≡ EQ ln
1
PX(X)
− E0, (18)
for every QX such that D(QX‖PX) < E0. This, in turn, is equivalent to the requirement given in
the first two lines of eq. (14). The third line of (14) is obtained as follows:
R∗w(E0) = min
{QX : D(QX‖PX)≤E0}
EQ log
1
PX(X)
−E0
= min
QX
sup
λ≥0
{
EQ log
1
PX(X)
+ λ[D(QX‖PX)−E0]− E0
}
= sup
λ≥0
min
QX
{
EQ log
1
PX(X)
+ λ[D(QX‖PX)−E0]− E0
}
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= sup
λ≥0
{
−λ ln
(∑
x∈X
[PX(x)]
1+1/λ
)
− (1 + λ)E0
}
, (19)
where the third equality is follows from convexity in QX and concavity (in fact, affinity) in λ.
B. Variable–Rate Codes
For variable–rate codes, we have the following lemma, which sets the stage for optimal rate func-
tions.
Lemma 2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of variable–rate codes that achieve
FA error exponent at least as large as E0 are:
Rs(QX) ≥ R
∗
s
(QX , E0)
∆
= E0 −D(QX‖PX ), (20)
Rw(QX) ≤ R
∗
w
(QX , E0)
∆
=
{
EQ log
1
PX(X)
− E0 D(QX‖PX) < E0
∞ D(QX‖PX) ≥ E0.
(21)
Observe that R∗s (QX , E0) + R
∗
w(QX , E0) = HQ(X) for all QX with D(QX‖PX) < E0, which
roughly speaking, means that the mapping from x to (s,w) is one–to–one within each type, T (QX).
Proof of Lemma 2. Eq. (9) easily extends to the variable–rate case, by simply substituting Rs(QX)
and Rw(QX) instead of Rs and Rw, respectively. Therefore, the same reasoning as in the proof of
Lemma 1 applies in the variable–rate setting considered here as well, except that now, there is no
need for optimization (maximization, in the case of Rs, and minimization, in the case of Rw), as
the binning rates are allowed to depend on the type, QX .
V. FR–FA Trade-off Functions
In this section, we characterize FR–FA trade-off functions for both the random coding ensembles
of both fixed–rate and variable–rate codes.
A. Fixed–Rate Codes
According to eq. (10), the random coding FR exponent depends on Rw) only, and it is a monoton-
ically, non–decreasing function of this variable. Thus, the best one can do with fixed–rate codes
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is to use the highest allowable binning rate, which is R∗w. Therefore, if we denote the fixed–rate
FR–FA trade-off function by EfFR[E0] (where the superscript “f” stands for “fixed–rate”), we have
the following expression for the optimal decoding metric, a(Q) = −HQ(X|Y ) (see eq. (12)),
EfFR[E0] = EFR(R
∗
w(E0)) = min
QXY
{D(QXY ‖PXY ) + [R
∗
w(E0)−HQ(X|Y )]+}, (22)
which is also well known to be the Csisza´r–style formula for the error exponent associated with
ordinary MAP decoding (of the full source vector X , rather than just the secret key S) for a
random Slepian–Wolf code (see, e.g., [3, eqs. (7), (19)]).
As mentioned already in the Introduction, in this paper, we are also be interested in Gallager–
style forms, since they are more convenient to work with when it comes to numerical calculations.
The Gallager–style form of eq. (22) is well known [5], [3, p. 9] to be
EfFR[E0] = max
0≤ρ≤1

− ln

∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
[PXY (x, y)]
1/(1+ρ)
)1+ρ+ ρR∗w(E0)

 . (23)
Upon substituting the expression of R∗w(E0) (see eq. (14)), we finally obtain
EfFR[E0] = max
0≤ρ≤1
sup
λ≥0

− ln

∑
y∈Y
(∑
x∈X
[PXY (x, y)]
1/(1+ρ)
)1+ρ−
ρλ ln
(∑
x∈X
[PX(x)]
1+1/λ
)
− ρ(1 + λ)E0
}
. (24)
B. Variable–Rate Codes
We now derive a FR–FA trade-off function for the variable–rate case, which will be denoted by
EvFR[E0].
The analysis associated with variable–rate codes is somewhat more complicated than with fixed–
rate codes. Note that since the alphabets, Wn(QX) and Sn(QX), of w and s, respectively, depend
on the type class, QX , of the source sequence, a given w can be generated only by types for which
enRw(Qx) is at least as large as the numerical index1 of w, and a similar comment applies to s. This
means that in the generalized posterior, defined in (3), the summations over the source vectors,
1By “numerical index”, we mean the integer corresponding to the location of w within Wn(QX), which is a number
between 1 and enRw(Qx).
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{x}, at both the numerator and the denominator, should now be limited only to members of the
type classes that support the given s and w. Consequently, some modifications in the analysis of
[9, Proof of Theorem 1] should be carried out in the variable–rate case.2 It is easy to see, however,
that a valid lower bound3 to the resulting FR error exponent is obtained if one simply substitutes
Rw(QX) instead of the fixed Rw of eqs. (10)–(12). In other words, we will use the expression,
EFR(Rw(·), QX0Y ) = min
QX0Y
{D(QX0Y ‖PX0Y ) +
min
QX|Y
[Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0)− a(QXY )]+]+}. (25)
Once again, since the FR exponent of eqs. (10)–(12) is a monotonically non–decreasing function of
the helper–message rate, the best we can do in terms of this expression, is to let Rw(QX) saturate
its maximum allowed value, R∗w(QX , E0), as given in Lemma 2.
Having adopted eq. (25) as our figure of merit, the following point is important as well: the
universal decoding metric a(QXY ) = −HQ(X|Y ), that we have used above for fixed–rate codes,
is no longer equivalent to that of MAP decoding (and hence no longer optimal) for variable–rate
codes. For a given rate function, Rw(QX), the following decoding metric should be used instead in
order to obtain the same random coding FR exponent as in MAP decoding:
a(QXY ) = Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y ). (26)
In this case, referring to eqs. (10) and (12) of [9], we have
E(Rw(·), QX0Y ) = inf
QX|Y
[Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+]+
= inf
QX|Y
[Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y ) + [Rw(QX0)−HQ(X0|Y )−
{Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y )}]+]+
= inf
QX|Y
[max{Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y ), Rw(QX0)−HQ(X0|Y )}]+]+
= [Rw(QX0)−HQ(X0|Y )]+
≥ min{[Rw(QX)−HQ(X|Y )]+ : EQ lnP (X|Y ) ≥ EQ lnP (X0|Y )}, (27)
2In particlar, the maximizations over {QX|Y }, in eqs. (19), (22) of [9], and the minimizations in eq. (23) therein,
should be limited only to types {QX|Y } that pertain to {QX} that support the given w.
3While the exact FR random coding error exponent can be derived in principle, it is much more complicated to
use than this lower bound. Nonetheless, as we show in the sequel, if even this lower bound would yield a significant
improvement relative to fixed–rate codes (as we demonstrate in the sequel), then a–fortiori, this would also be the
case with the exact FR error exponent. Also, this lower bound is tight for all {w} whose numerical index is a
sub–exponential function of n (and then supported by essentially all types {QX}).
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where the last line corresponds to (pairwise) errors pertaining to the MAP decoder (for ordinary
Slepian–Wolf decoding), and hence the optimality. Now, for Rw(QX) = R
∗
w(QX , E0), we can
present the above bound to the FR error exponent (omitting the subscript 0 of X0, which is no
longer needed):
EvFR[E0] = min
{QXY : D(QX‖PX)≤E0}
{
D(QXY ‖PXY ) +
[
EQ ln
1
PX(X)
− E0 −HQ(X|Y )
]
+
}
. (28)
This is the Csisza´r–style formula of the corresponding FR–FA trade-off function for variable–rate
codes. The following theorem provides the Gallager–style form of the same function.
Theorem 1 The variable–rate FR–FA trade-off function (28) can also be presented as
Ev
FR
[E0] = max
0≤λ≤1
sup
ρ≥0
max
W

− ln

∑
y∈W
[∑
x∈X
[PXY (x, y)PX (x)
ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
]1+λ−
(ρ+ λ)E0} , (29)
where the maximum over W is taken over the simplex of probability distributions over X , i.e.,
W (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and
∑
x∈X W (x) = 1.
Before turning to the proof of Theorem 1, we pause to demonstrate it and to discuss some
aspects, consequences and extensions of this theorem.
Optimization issues. First, note that the formula (29) involves optimization over a probability
distribution W in addition to the parameters ρ and λ, namely, a total of |X |+ 1 parameters. This
number is never larger (and in most cases, considerably smaller) than the |X |·|Y|−1 parameters that
are associated with the minimization over QXY in the Csisza´r–style formula of eq. (28). Moreover,
since the Gallager–style formula (29) involves only maximization, any arbitrary choice of λ, ρ and
W in their allowed ranges, would yield a valid lower bound (a guarantee) on the achievable FR
error exponent. This is different from the situation with the Csisza´r–style formula, which involves
minimization, and hence allows no such privilege: one must carry out the minimization in order
to obtain the achievable FR error exponent. One drawback of the Gallager–style formula is that
the range of maximization over the parameter ρ is infinite. In practical numerical calculations,
however, one can initially limit the range to an interval of the form [0, ρ0], and then gradually
enlarge ρ0 up to the point where no further increase in ρ0 improves on the resulting maximum.
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A few words are in order concerning the maximization over W , which is a relatively computa-
tionally demanding step, especially for a large source alphabet. First, note that in situations with
a sufficient degree of symmetry, the optimal W turns out to be the uniform distribution, a fact
that saves the optimization numerically. This turns out to be the case if PX is uniform and the
|Y| probability vectors {PX|Y=y(x|y), x ∈ X}, are all permutations, {πy}, of one such vector, that
form a group (w.r.t. compositions of permutations), such that (1/|Y|)
∑
y π
−1
y [W ] = U , where U
designates the uniform distribution over X . This happens, for instance, when PX = U and PX|Y is
a modulo–additive channel. To see why this is true, we define
f(W ) = inf
QXY
∑
y∈Y
QY (y) ln
QY (y)
PY (y)
+
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)
∑
x
QX|Y (x|y)
[
ln
QX|Y (x|y)
PX|Y (x|y)
+
(ρ+ λ) ln
1
PX(x)
+ λ lnQX|Y (x|y) + ρ lnW (x)
]
, (30)
which we show4 to be equal to
f(W ) = − ln

∑
y∈Y
[∑
x∈X
[PXY (x, y)PX(x)
ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
]1+λ . (31)
From the first representation of f , it is easy to see that it is concave in W . From the second
representation and the assumed symmetry, it is easy to see that for every W and every y ∈ Y,
f(πy[W ]) = f(W ). Thus,
f(W ) =
1
|Y|
∑
y∈Y
f(πy[W ]) ≤ f

 1
|Y|
∑
y∈Y
πy[W ]

 = f(U), (32)
which means that the optimal W is uniform. In the general case, the optimization over W is a
convex program, and so, there are standard solvers that can handle this problem more efficiently
than a brute–force exhaustive search.
Example. In order to demonstrate the advantage of variable–rate codes relative to fixed–rate codes
in terms of the FR–FA trade-off, we now provide a numerical example. Consider the case of a double
binary source with alphabets X = Y = {0, 1}, and joint probabilities given by PXY (0, 0) = 0.32,
PXY (0, 1) = 0.08, PXY (1, 0) = 0.06, and PXY (1, 1) = 0.54. Fig. 1 displays the two FR–FA trade-
off functions, EfFR[E0] and E
v
FR[E0], for this source. As can be seen, the gap between these two
4See the proof of Theorem 1 in the sequel.
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functions is rather considerable, which means that variable–rate codes with optimal rate functions,
are significantly better in terms of these trade–offs. This example is quite representative in the
sense that other examples (with different source probabilities) yielded qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 1: Graphs of EfFR[E0] (solid red curve) and E
v
FR[E0] (dashed blue curve) for the double binary
source, defined by PXY (0, 0) = 0.32, PXY (0, 1) = 0.08, PXY (1, 0) = 0.06, and PXY (1, 1) = 0.54.
Variable–rate codes do not always improve on fixed–rate codes. It should be kept in
mind, however, that there are situations where variable–rate codes offer no improvement over
fixed–rate codes, i.e., they might have exactly the same FR–FA trade-off function in some cases.
One such example is the case where the source X has a uniform distribution. In this case, the
optimal rate function for variable–rate codes turns out to be R∗w(QX , E0) = ln |X | −E0 (whenever
D(QX‖PX ) < E0), which is independent of QX , and hence is a fixed–rate anyway. So unless the
dominant type QX happens to fall in the region {QX : D(QX‖PX) ≥ E0}, when the source is
uniform, variable–rate codes cannot offer any improvement beyond the performance of fixed–rate
codes.
Another aspect is associated with the decoding metric. Even for a general source, PXY , if
one uses a random variable–rate code, but decodes it using the decoding metric function of fixed–
rate codes, a(QXY ) = −HQ(X|Y ), instead of the optimal decoding metric for variable–rate codes,
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a(QXY ) = R
∗
w(QX , E0) −HQ(X|Y ), then the resulting FR–FA trade–off function turns out to be
exactly the same as with fixed–rate codes.
Mismatched decoding. Our results can be extended to apply to a mismatched decoding metric,
a(QXY ) = EQ lnP
′(X|Y ) (see eq. (6)), for an arbitrary P ′, using the same techniques. The
resulting fixed–rate Gallager–style FR–FA trade-off function would then be
EfFR[E0] = max
0≤s≤1
max
0≤t≤s

− ln

∑
y∈Y
[(∑
x∈X
[P ′(x|y)]t/s
)s
·
(∑
x′∈X
PXY (x
′, y)
[P ′(x′|y)]t
)]
+
sR∗w(E0)} , (33)
where R∗w(E0) is as defined in Lemma 1. The corresponding variable–rate rae-off function (which
cannot be smaller), is given by
EvFR[E0] = sup
λ≥0
max
0≤s≤1
max
0≤t≤s
max
W

− ln

∑
y∈Y
[(∑
x∈X
[P ′(x|y)]t/s[PX(x)]
1+λ/s[W (x)]−λ/s
)s
×
(∑
x′∈X
PXY (x
′, y)
[P ′(x′|y)]t
)])
− (λ+ s)E0
}
. (34)
Expurgated exponents. In [9], expurgated FR exponents were also derived, and so, in principle,
one could carry out similar analyses for trade–offs between expurgated exponents and the best
achievable FA error exponents. We have not pursued such derivations in this work since they are
significantly more complicated, but it is anticipated that similar conclusions would apply concerning
the advantage of variable–rate codes over fixed–rate codes. In this context, it should be emphasized
that one of our important messages in this work is not only that variable–rate codes are better than
fixed–rate codes, but that moreover, we characterize the optimal rate functions, independently of
the type of FR error exponents being considered (random coding exponents, expurgated exponents,
sphere–packing exponent [9, Theorem 3] at a certain rate region, etc.) since their derivation stems
from the FA error exponent, which has an exact characterization [9, Section V].
The remaining part of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Throughout this proof we will make frequent use of the minimax theorem,
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based on convexity–concavity arguments. We will also use repeatedly the fact that
min
Q
[D(Q‖P ) +EQf(X)] = − ln
[∑
x
P (x)e−f(x)
]
.
Now,
EvFR[E0] = inf
QXY
sup
0≤λ≤1
sup
ρ≥0
{
D(QXY ‖PXY ) + λ
[
EQ ln
1
PX(X)
− E0 −HQ(X|Y )
]
+ .
ρ [D(QX‖PX)− E0]}
= sup
0≤λ≤1
sup
ρ≥0
inf
QXY
{
D(QXY ‖PXY ) + λ
[
EQ ln
1
PX(X)
− E0 −HQ(X|Y )
]
+
ρ [D(QX‖PX)− E0]}
= sup
0≤λ≤1
sup
ρ≥0
inf
QY
{
D(QY ‖PY ) + inf
QX|Y
(
D(QX|Y ‖PX|Y |QY )+
λ
[
EQ ln
1
PX(X)
− E0 −HQ(X|Y )
]
+ ρ [D(QX‖PX)− E0]
)}
= sup
0≤λ≤1
sup
ρ≥0
inf
QY

D(QY ‖PY ) + infQX|Y
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)
∑
x
QX|Y (x|y)
[
ln
QX|Y (x|y)
PX|Y (x|y)
+
(ρ+ λ) ln
1
PX(x)
+ λ lnQX|Y (x|y) + ρ lnQX(x)
]
− (ρ+ λ)E0
}
. (35)
Consider first the inner–most minimization over {QX|Y }:
inf
QX|Y
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)
∑
x∈X
QX|Y (x|y)
[
ln
QX|Y (x|y)
PX|Y (x|y)
+ (ρ+ λ) ln
1
PX(x)
+ λ lnQX|Y (x|y) + ρ lnQX(x)
]
= inf
QX|Y
sup
W
∑
y∈Y
QY (y)
∑
x∈X
QX|Y (x|y)
[
ln
QX|Y (x|y)
PX|Y (x|y)
+ (ρ+ λ) ln
1
PX(x)
+ λ lnQX|Y (x|y) + ρ lnW (x)
]
= sup
W
∑
y∈Y
QY (y) inf
QX|Y
∑
x∈X
QX|Y (x|y)
[
ln
QX|Y (x|y)
PX|Y (x|y)
+ (ρ+ λ) ln
1
PX(x)
+ λ lnQX|Y (x|y) + ρ lnW (x)
]
= (1 + λ) sup
W
∑
y∈Y
QY (y) inf
QX|Y
∑
x∈X
QX|Y (x|y) ln
QX|Y (x|y)
[PX|Y (x|y)PX (x)ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
= −(1 + λ) inf
W
∑
y
Q(y) ln
(∑
x
[P (x|y)P (x)ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
)
, (36)
which, after the minimization over QY , becomes
inf
QY

D(QY ‖PY )− (1 + λ) inf
W
∑
y∈Y
QY (y) ln
(∑
x∈X
[PX|Y (x|y)PX(x)
ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
)
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= − inf
W
ln

∑
y∈Y
[∑
x∈X
[PXY (x, y)PX(x)
ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
]1+λ . (37)
It follows that
EvFR[E0] = max
0≤λ≤1
sup
ρ≥0
sup
W

− ln

∑
y∈Y
[∑
x∈X
[PXY (x, y)PX (x)
ρ+λW (x)−ρ]1/(1+λ)
]1+λ− (ρ+ λ)E0

 .
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
VI. Privacy Leakage
The privacy leakage of the system is defined as I(X;W ). Since W is a deterministic function of
X, we have I(X ;W ) = H(W ) = −E lnP (W ).
Consider first variable–rate codes. For a given, arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, let
Tǫ(PX) =
⋂
{QX : D(QX‖PX)≤ǫ}
T (QX), (38)
Let w be a helper message whose numerical index does not exceed |Tǫ(PX)|. Now, for the typical
code,
P (w) =
∑
x
P (x)I{f(x) = w)}
≥
∑
x∈Tǫ(PX)
P (x)I{f(x) = w)}
≥
∑
x∈Tǫ(PX)
2−n[HP (X)+ǫ] ·N(Tǫ(PX),w), (39)
where N(Tǫ(PX),w) = |Tǫ(PX)∩ {x : f(x) = w}|, which is the sum of independent binomial ran-
dom variables (one for every QX in the ǫ–neighborhood of PX) with a total of |Tǫ(PX)| trials and suc-
cess rate of at least exp2[−nmax{Rw(QX) : D(QX‖PX ) ≤ ǫ}]. Assuming that Rw(PX) < HP (X),
then if Rw(·) is continuous and ǫ is very small, we have that for the typical code, N(Tǫ(PX),w) is
of the exponential order of 2n[HP (X)−Rw(PX)−δ(ǫ)], where δ(ǫ) is some function that tends to zero as
ǫ tends to zero. Thus, for the typical code, P (w) (for w whose numerical index is in the designated
range) is essentially lower bounded by the exponential order of 2−nRw(PX). The probability that
w falls in the complementary set, where its numerical index exceeds |Tǫ(PX)| is upper bounded
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by the probability that X /∈ Tǫ(PX), which tends to zero as n → ∞. Consequently, this set of
(a–typical) {w} has an asymptotically vanishing contribution to the entropy of W . It follows that
H(W ) is essentially upper bounded by nRw(PX), and for the optimal rate function, this means
n[HP (X) − E0]. This means that if H(W ) is required to be smaller than nH0, for some given
H0, this can be the case only if H0 ≥ HP (X) − E0. Since the best achievable E0 is IP (X;Y ) (see
[13, Theorem 1]), then the smallest achievable H0 is about HP (X|Y ), which is coherent with [6,
Proposition 2.4].
We therefore summarize our conclusion as follows: it is possible to comply with both a privacy
leakage constraint, H0, and a FA error exponent constraint, E0, as long as H0 ≥ HP (X) − E0. As
intuition suggests, there is no real tension between the requirements on privacy leakage and FA
error exponent, as they both work in the same direction of making it hard for imposters. As the
former becomes more restrictive, the latter can be made more relaxed, and vice versa.
In the fixed–rate case the situation is somewhat different. Let N(QX ,w) be the number of
x–vectors of type QX for which f(x) = w, which is a binomial random variable with |T (QX)|
·
=
enHQ(X) trials and success rate of e−nRw . Now, for the typical code,
P (w) =
∑
x
P (x)I{f(x) = w)}
=
∑
QX
P (x)
∣∣∣∣
x∈T (QX)
·N(QX ,w)
·
=
∑
{QX : H(QX)≥Rw}
e−n[H(QX)+D(QX‖PX)] · en[H(QX)−Rw]
·
= exp
{
−n
[
Rw + min
{QX : H(QX)≥Rw}
D(QX‖PX)
]}
, (40)
independently of w, and so, for the typical code
H(W ) ≈ n
[
Rw + min
{QX : H(QX)≥Rw}
D(QX‖PX)
]
. (41)
If we impose the constraint H(W ) ≤ nH0 (in addition to the FA constraint), for some prescribed
constant H0, then this constraint is equivalent to the requirement that there would exist at least
one pmf QX for which Rw ≤ min{H(QX),H0 −D(QX‖PX )}, or equivalently,
Rw ≤ max
QX
min{HQ(X),H0 −D(QX‖PX )}
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= max
QX
min
0≤s≤1
{(1 − s)HQ(X) + s[H0 −D(QX‖PX)]}
= min
0≤s≤1
max
QX
{(1 − s)HQ(X) + s[H0 −D(QX‖PX)]}
= min
0≤s≤1
max
Q
∑
x∈X
QX(x)
{
−(1− s) lnQX(x) + s ln
PX(x)
QX(x)
+ sH0
}
= min
0≤s≤1
max
QX
∑
x∈X
QX(x)
{
ln
P sX(x)
QX(x)
+ sH0
}
= min
0≤s≤1
{
ln
[∑
x∈X
P sX(x)
]
+ sH0
}
∆
= R∗w(H0). (42)
Of course, if both a privacy constaint and an FA error exponent constraint are imposed at the same
time, then for fixed–rate codes, Rw is not allowed to exceed min{R
∗
w(E0), R
∗
w(H0)}.
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